India’s abrupt decision to suspend multiple cross-border railway projects in Bangladesh, citing political unrest and worker safety concerns, risks undermining its own long-term strategic and economic interests in the region. With nearly $600 million in infrastructure now on pause, New Delhi is walking away from a corridor that has never been more critical for connecting its isolated northeastern states with the rest of the country.
According to Indian media reports, the government has halted funding and construction on three active projects and shelved survey work on five others, citing internal instability in Bangladesh. Yet the move leaves India’s so-called “seven sisters” in the northeast dependent once again on the precarious Siliguri Corridor, a narrow land passage commonly known as the “chicken’s neck.”
The halted projects were never just about transportation. They were a strategic counterweight to regional isolation. The Akhaura-Agartala Cross-Border Rail Link, backed by roughly $48 million in Indian grants, was designed to connect Tripura and Assam with Bangladesh’s rail network. Similarly, the $388 million Khulna-Mongla Port Rail Line would have provided India with indirect access to Bangladesh’s second-largest seaport. The Dhaka-Tongi-Joydebpur expansion, partially funded by a $192 million line of credit from India’s EXIM Bank, aimed to modernize a vital segment of Bangladesh’s rail infrastructure.
Collectively, these projects would have transformed connectivity for India’s northeast, cutting costs, shortening distances and reducing military vulnerability through a second access route. Abandoning this path weakens India’s leverage just when geopolitical alignment with Dhaka could offer economic and strategic dividends.
Instead, India is now pivoting toward alternative routes through Nepal and Bhutan, exploring up to $480 million in new investments there. Survey work is already underway on several new lines in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, as New Delhi looks to increase capacity feeding into the Siliguri Corridor. While these alternatives might eventually offer redundancy, they come with logistical and diplomatic challenges of their own, including high-altitude terrain and underdeveloped rail ecosystems.
Bangladesh, meanwhile, remains India’s largest trading partner in South Asia, with bilateral trade reaching $12.9 billion in 2024. Pulling back from joint infrastructure at a time when regional trade is growing sends the wrong message not only to Dhaka but to other neighbors who might interpret India’s actions as inconsistent or reactive.
The timing is also notable. Bangladesh is entering a period of political uncertainty, and India’s retreat could create space for other powers, particularly China, to deepen influence by offering infrastructure support and political solidarity. Instead of isolating Dhaka, India could be working to stabilize and deepen ties, particularly when mutual interests in connectivity, trade and counterbalancing regional rivalries align so clearly.
India may have genuine concerns about worker safety and political unrest in Bangladesh. But disengagement is not a strategy. It is a setback. Rather than walking away, India should be striking a new bargain with Dhaka, one that strengthens the foundation of its eastern connectivity and reaffirms its commitment to regional integration.