Bangladesh’s interim leader Muhammad Yunus stirred controversy during his recent visit to China by stating the obvious: India’s northeastern states, often referred to as the “Seven Sisters,” are landlocked, with no direct access to the ocean. Yunus described Bangladesh as “the only guardian of the ocean” for the region. Though India responded with alarm, painting the remarks as provocative and pro-China, the reality is far more nuanced and far less menacing.
The geography is irrefutable. The Northeast, despite its vibrant cultures and strategic importance, remains physically cut off from maritime trade routes without passage through Bangladesh. A glance at a map supports Yunus’ point. This is not a political slight, but a geographic fact. And for more than a decade, Bangladesh has worked constructively with India to turn that geographic reality into a platform for regional cooperation, not conflict.
Yunus’ comment must be viewed in that broader context. It was made in China, yes, a country with growing stakes in South Asia, but the framing of the Seven Sisters as landlocked is not new, nor inflammatory. Bangladesh’s push to market itself as a maritime gateway is not anti-India; it is pro-trade, pro-connectivity, and economically rational. India has long recognized this, investing in transit agreements, energy corridors, and regional road and rail infrastructure via Bangladesh. If Dhaka now seeks to expand its portfolio to other partners, that is not betrayal. It is diversification.
Critics argue that Yunus’ words, and especially their timing, reflect a pivot away from India toward Beijing. That may be partly true, but it is also a predictable shift amid the political transition in Dhaka following the ouster of longtime Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Since her departure, relations between the two countries have been strained, with India citing concerns over minority rights and security cooperation. Even so, Yunus met with the Indian prime minister on the sidelines of the recent BIMSTEC summit, underscoring that diplomatic channels remain open.
Rather than viewing every Bangladeshi overture to China as a zero-sum loss, India might take this opportunity to reaffirm its own connectivity agenda. It already operates the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport Project through Myanmar and controls the Sittwe Port, both critical to easing its reliance on the vulnerable Siliguri Corridor. Building stronger economic ties with Dhaka, not reacting defensively to every statement, would better serve long-term Indian interests.
Yes, Bangladesh has domestic instability, and yes, Yunus is navigating a complicated geopolitical terrain. But that does not make his statement false, nor does it make Bangladesh a threat. Rather than reading geography as a provocation, India should recognize it as a shared opportunity, one that, for years, the two nations have been working to seize.
In the end, Yunus said what many already knew. It is time for the region to move past the politics of wounded pride and return to the business of building bridges, figuratively and literally.